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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE
PROCESS AND AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT
TO COURT-APPOINTED PSYCHIATRIC
ASSISTANCE IN STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Griffin v. Illinois,1 the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]here
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has."' 2 Since that time, the Supreme
Court has spent a great deal ofjudicial energy defining and develop-
ing the scope of an indigent's rights in criminal proceedings. Re-
cently, in Ake v. Oklahoma,3 the Court expanded the rights of
indigents one step further. In Ake, the Supreme Court held that
when an indigent defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at
trial, the state must provide access to a psychiatrist to assist the de-
fendant in his defense.
4
While requiring the state to provide psychiatric assistance is
consistent with the Supreme Court's gradual expansion of indigent
defendants' rights, the Court in Ake left many questions unresolved.
In leaving to the state the decision of how to implement this right,5
the Court failed to define the exact level of the state's fiscal respon-
sibility and left the opinion open to the possibility of over-extension.
Moreover, the majority's holding seems to provide little protection
against frivolous appeals. The Court also neglected to articulate the
requirements necessary to satisfy the showing that the defendant
must make to demonstrate that his sanity at the time of the offense is
1 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the Court held that the state must provide an indi-
gent defendant with a trial transcript when the transcript is necessary for an effective
appeal.
2 Id. at 19.
3 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
4 Id. at 1092.
5 Id. at 1097.
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likely to be a significant factor at trial. 6
This Note will examine Supreme Court precedent leading up to
the Ake decision. It will analyze Ake and consider the possible ramifi-
cations of the decision. It will then discuss legislative and other ju-
dicial alternatives to the Ake decision. Finally, this Note will
conclude that, despite the Supreme Court's failure to thoroughly re-
solve the question presented in Ake, its decision to expand the rights
of criminally charged indigents is a positive step and one that can
only promote due process fundamental fairness.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AKE
In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with the
murder of a couple and the attempted murder of the couple's two
children. 7 At his arraignment, Ake's behavior was "so bizarre that
the trial judge sua sponte ordered him to be examined by a psychia-
trist. ' 8 After a competency hearing, the Court found Ake to be "a
mentally ill person in need of care and treatment" who was incom-
petent to stand trial.9 After six weeks in a state hospital where Ake
received daily doses of an antipsychotic drug, the chief forensic psy-
chiatrist informed the Court that Ake had become competent to
stand trial.' 0 At that point, the state resumed proceedings against
Ake. I
At a pretrial conference, Ake's attorney instructed the Court
6 Id. at 1100 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
7 105 S. Ct. at 1090. The charges stemmed from an episode in which Ake and an
accomplice gained entrance into the home of Reverend and Mrs. Douglas, and ran-
sacked the home while holding the family at gunpoint. Ake v. State, 633 P.2d 1, 4
(1983). The two men attempted to rape the twelve year old daughter and after having
failed, bound and gagged her and forced her to lie on the floor with the other family
members. After the accomplice left the home, Ake shot all of the members of the Doug-
las family. Id. Reverend and Mrs. Douglas died from their wounds; their two daughters
were able to escape. Id. Ake and his accomplice were captured "in Colorado following a
month-long crime spree which took them through ... much of the western half of the
United States." Id. The twelve year old daughter identified Ake in a lineup, and Ake
later confessed to the shootings. Id.
8 Id. at 1090. During his psychiatric examination, Ake claimed that he was " 'the
sword of vengeance' of the Lord." Id. The psychiatrist diagnosed Ake as a probable
paranoid schizophrenic with delusional tendencies and recommended that Ake undergo
"prolonged psychiatric evaluation" to determine his competency to stand trial. Id. at
1091.
9 Id. at 1091. At the competency hearing, a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a dan-
gerous psychotic and remarked that "[b]ecause of the severity of his mental illness and
because of the intensities of his rage, his poor control, his delusions, he requires a maxi-




1985] INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE 1067
that his client would raise an insanity defense at trial' 2 and re-
quested that a psychiatrist examine Ake to determine his mental
condition at the time of the offense. 13 The trial judge, relying on
Smith v. Baldi,1 4 rejected the defendant's contention that an indigent
defendant has a constitutional right to receive psychiatric assistance
when such assistance is necessary to the defense. 15
At trial, Ake's sole defense was insanity. 16 Although the de-
fense presented psychiatric testimony concerning Ake's behavior at
the state hospital, there was no testimony concerning Ake's mental
condition at the time of the offense because he had never been ex-
amined on that point.' 7 The Court instructed the jurors that Ake
could only be found not guilty by reason of insanity if he was unable
to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense. 18 The
jurors were further instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane
unless he presented evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
about his sanity at that time. 19 Because there was no psychiatric tes-
timony about Ake's sanity at the time of the offense, Ake had a for-
midable task in presenting an adequate defense. The jury was not
convinced by Ake's insanity plea and found him guilty on all
counts. 20
At the sentencing proceedings, the prosecutor relied on the tes-
timony of the psychiatrist who examined Ake and testified that Ake
was dangerous to society. 21 Ake had no expert witness to counter
this testimony or to present evidence to mitigate his punishment.
22
The jury sentenced Ake to death on the two murder counts and to
500 years imprisonment on both of the counts of shooting with in-
tent to kill.23
Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, ar-
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 344 U.S. 561 (1953). In Smith v. Baldi, the Court held that the trial court's refusal
to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination of the petitioner's sanity was not
a violation of due process. Id. at 565.
15 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
16 Id.
17 Id. In response to the prosecutor's question of whether tests had been performed
concerning Ake's mental condition at the time of the offense, the examining psychia-
trists responded that no such tests were performed. Id. Thus, "there was no expert testi-
mony for either side on Ake's sanity at the time of the offense." Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. After the defendant raises a reasonable doubt about his sanity, the burden of
proof shifts to the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1091-92.





guing that, as an indigent defendant, he should have been provided
a court-appointed psychiatrist. 24 Rejecting this argument, the court
concluded that "the unique nature of capital cases notwithstanding,
the State does not have the responsibility of providing such services
to indigents charged with capital crimes." 25 It therefore affirmed
Ake's convictions and sentences. 26 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to address the significant consitiutional question
of the extent of an indigent defendant's rights in criminal
proceedings.
27
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
In holding that an indigent defendant is entitled under the con-
stitution to the assistance of a psychiatrist both in preparing his de-
fense and at the sentencing phase of the criminal proceedings,
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,28 emphasized the need to
provide indigents with "[m]eaningful access to justice. ' 29 Employ-
ing a due process analysis, Marshall reaffirmed the principle that
"fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to an 'adequate
opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary
system."' 30
The Court considered three factors set forth in Mathews v. El-
dridge,31 as relevant to its determination of the procedures that are
constitutionally required:
The private interest that will be affected by the action of the State...
the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be
providcd. . . the probable value of the additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous depriva-
24 Id.
25 Id. (quoting Ake v. State, 633 P.2d 1, 6 (1983)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion of the Court in whichJustices Pow-
ell, O'Conner, Blackmun, White, Stevens and Brennan joined. Chief Justice Burger
concurred. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
29 Id. at 1094. Before reaching the merits of Ake's claim, the Court first resolved a
jurisdictional conflict. Id. at 1092. The state argued that Ake had waived his claim for a
psychiatrist since he failed to repeat his request for a court-appointed psychiatrist in his
motion for a new trial. Id. The state thus claimed that this Court should not review this
issue since the lower court's holding rested on an adequate and independent state
ground. Id. Rejecting this argument, the majority noted that the claim concerned a con-
stitutional question and that "when resolution of the state procedural law question de-
pends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state law prong of the Court's holding is not
independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded." Id. at 1093.
30 Id. at 1094. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
31 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Mathews, the Court held that an evidentiary hearing
is not necessary prior to the termination of Social Security disability payments. Id. at
349.
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tion of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided.32
The analysis of these three factors compelled the Court to conclude
that indigent defendants in Ake's situation should be provided ac-
cess to a competent psychiatrist in preparing and presenting their
defenses.
33
The Court first reasoned that the vital nature of the individual's
interest in the criminal proceeding is readily apparent when capital
punishment is at stake. As the Court explained, "[t]he private inter-
est in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individ-
ual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling." 34 The
Court thus concluded that, "[t]he interest of the individual in the
outcome... is obvious and weighs heavily in our analysis." 35
The Court next considered the state's interest.36 Justice Mar-
shall counciled that states would incur some additional expense by
providing psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants, but he
noted that any economic burden was outweighed by the state's in-
terest in the fair adjudication of criminal trials.37 Since the Court
limits the state's obligation to providing one competent psychia-
trist,38Justice Marshall reasoned that the economic burden imposed
on the state is at most, slight. Justice Marshall also rejected the
state's argument that the costs involved in providing such assistance
"would result in a staggering burden" because "[m]any states, as
well as the Federal Government [provide such assistance and] have
not found the financial burden so great... ."39 The Court thus con-
cluded "that the governmental interest in denying Ake the assist-
ance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in light of the compelling
interest of both the state and the individual in accurate
dispositions. ' 40
Finally, the Court examined "the probable value of the psychi-
atric assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if
such assistance is not offered."'4 ' Justice Marshall stressed the "piv-
otal role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings"
and noted that psychiatric assistance may be crucial to the defend-
32 105 S. Ct. at 1094 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).




37 Id. at 1095.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1094; see id. at 1094 n. 4 (citing thirty-three state statutes providing expert
witnesses in some circumstances).
40 Id. at 1095.
41 Id.
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ant's defense. 42 He cited the Federal CriminalJustice Act 43 and var-
ious state legislative and judicial responses44 to support this
proposition. Justice Marshall reasoned further that psychiatric
assistance is necessary to the defendant because, unlike lay persons,
psychiatrists can gather information through professional examina-
tion and "offer opinions about how the defendant's mental condi-
tion might have affected his behavior at the time in question.45
Finding that the risk of error in resolving the insanity issue is
"extremely high,"' 46 Justice Marshall stressed the need for psychiat-
ric experts on both sides to ensure the "most accurate determina-
tion of the truth."'47 Marshall reasoned that, "because there often is
no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity," 48 juries
necessarily rely upon the testimony of psychiatrists in making their
determinations. Thus, Justice Marshall concluded that "the testi-
mony of psychiatrists can be crucial." 49
Although these factors appear to weigh in favor of providing
Ake and similarly situated defendants with psychiatric assistance,
Justice Marshall noted that "[a] defendant's mental condition is not
necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding... and it is unlikely
that psychiatric assistance ... would be of probable value" in every
criminal case.50 The Court, therefore, required that a defendant
demonstrate "to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the of-
fense is to be a significant factor at trial" before he is provided with
42 Id. The notion "that upon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity.., experts
are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense," Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456,
461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929), has been widely asserted. See e.g., Comment, The Indi-
gent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert & Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970).
43 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1968). See infra notes 125, 155.
44 See infra notes 157, 161 and accompanying text.
45 105 S. Ct. at 1095. Psychiatrists "know the probative questions to ask of the op-
posing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers." Id.
46 105 S. Ct. at 1096. The high risk of error is the result of several factors. Most
obvious is the fact that because psychiatry is not an exact science, psychiatric judgments
are often unreliable and invalid. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry & the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). The room for
psychiatrists' biases in combination with the subjectivity inherent in psychiatric evalua-
tions are other factors which create a high risk of error. The lack of consensus in psy-
chiatric opinions, see Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert - Some Comments
Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 99, 110 (1976), and the fact that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness
are wrong more often than they are right, Ennis & Litwack, supra at 737, are illustrative
of this high risk of error.
47 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1096-97.
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this expert assistance. 51
The majority next applied this due process balancing approach
to determine the constitutionality of the procedures employed at the
capital sentencing proceeding.52 Because Ake was denied psychiat-
ric assistance, he was unable to rebut the prosecution's evidence of
his future dangerousness. 53 The Court thus held that the lower
court's refusal to grant Ake a psychiatrist at the sentencing proceed-
ing was a denial of the accused's due process rights.54
Application of the three factors of the Mathews balancing test
led Justice Marshall to conclude that Ake and similarly situated de-
fendants must be accorded psychiatric assistance at the sentencing
proceeding. First, the Court determined that both the defendant
and the state have a compelling interest in an accurate determina-
tion and fair adjudication at the sentencing phase.55 Second, the
Court reasoned that the monetary considerations are no more per-
suasive in this context than at trial.5 6 Third, the Court found that
the probable value of psychiatric assistance is certainly as great in
the sentencing proceeding as in other phases of the criminal trial.57
In making these findings, Justice Marshall stressed the impor-
tant function of the adversary system to "uncover, recognize, and
take due account of shortcomings. . ." in the views of the prosecu-
tor's psychiatrists. 58 As Justice Marshall stated, "[w]ithout a psychi-
atrist's assistance, the defendant cannot offer a well-informed
expert's opposing view, and thereby loses a significant opportunity
to raise in the jurors' minds questions about the State's proof of an
aggravating factor." 59 After applying the balancing test, Justice
Marshall concluded, that "[w]here the consequence of error is so
great, the relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident,
and the burden on the state so slim, due process requires... psychi-
atric... assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase." 60
Applying these standards to Ake's case, the Court concluded
that since "Ake's sanity was likely to be a significant factor in his
51 Id. at 1097.
52 Id. The Court limited its discussion of the appropriateness of psychiatric assistance
to the "context of capital sentencing proceedings, when the State presents psychiatric










defense" 6 1 and Ake's future dangerousness was a significant factor
at the sentencing phase,62 Ake was entitled to the assistance of a
psychiatrist both in preparing his case and at the sentencing pro-
ceeding. Further, the Court concluded that "the denial of that
assistance deprived him of due process."
63
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment, stated that
the holding of Ake should be limited to the facts presented in the
case.64 Concerned with the "finality of the sentence imposed" in a
capital case, Chief Justice Burger stressed that the indigent capital
defendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance for the preparation
and presentation of his insanity defense. 65 However, the ChiefJus-
tice was hesitant to provide psychiatric assistance in non-capital
cases where such protection may be unwarranted, stating that
"[n]othing in the Court's opinion reaches non-capital cases."
66
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist set forth two arguments. First,
he argued that the facts of Ake do not "warrant the establishment of
such a principle."' 67 Second, Rehnquist asserted that the constitu-
tional rule promulgated by the majority was too broad.
68
Justice Rehnquist stressed the brutal nature of the crime com-
mitted and the abundance of evidence disproving Ake's insanity in
concluding that Ake did not make a sufficient showing that his sanity
was likely to be a significant factor at trial.69 Justice Rehnquist
noted that under the constitution, "the burden of proving insanity
61 Id. at 1099. The Court found that Ake's mental state at the time of the offense was
likely to be a substantial factor in his defense because of several variables. These vari-
ables include: the fact that Ake's sole defense was insanity, that his behavior at arraign-
ment was so bizarre that the trial judge ordered a competency examination, that a state
psychiatrist suggested that Ake be committed, that he was found competent to stand
trial only after receiving heavy doses of sedation, that the psychiatrists who examined
Ake for competency suggested that Ake's "mental illness might have begun many years
earlier," and that Oklahoma recognizes the insanity defense. Id. at 1098.
62 Id. at 1099. "The state psychiatrist who treated Ake at the state mental hospital
testified at the guilt phase that ... Ake posed a threat of continuing criminal violence.
This testimony raised the issue of Ake's future dangerousness, which is an aggravating
factor under Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme .... and on which the prosecutor
relied at sentencing." Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1099 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1101. In addition to the brutal nature of the crime committed, Justice Rehn-
quist pointed to "the month- long crime spree following the murders," as evidence rais-
ing little doubt as to Ake's sanity. Id. Moreover, Rehnquist also pointed to Ake's forty-
four page signed confession, containing no suggestion of insanity, as further evidence
which questioned Ake's alleged insanity. Id.
[Vol. 761072
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can be placed on the defendant."'70 He reasoned that the burden
was properly placed on Ake in this case, and that Ake simply failed
to carry the burden.71 In so concluding, Justice Rehnquist specifi-
cally considered Ake's failure to call lay witnesses "who could have
testified concerning Ake's actions that might have had a bearing on
his sanity at the time of the offense," '72 the testimony outside the
jury's presence of Ake's cellmate who stated "that Ake had told him
that he was going to try to 'play crazy"' 73 and the state's failure to
introduce any evidence concerning Ake's mental condition at the
time of the offense.
74
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for its
failure to specify the requirements necessary to satisfy the defend-
ant's preliminary showing that "his sanity at the time of the offense
is likely to be a significant factor at trial." 75 Given this omission in
the Court's opinion and the fact that Oklahoma law places the bur-
den of raising a reasonable doubt as to one's sanity on the defend-
ant, Rehnquist had little difficulty supporting his proposition that
Ake was sane.
76
Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that Ake was entitled to psychiatric assistance at the sentencing pro-
ceeding because Ake's future dangerousness was a significant fac-
tor.77 Justice Rehnquist noted initially that there was no need for
the Court to even consider the issues raised by the sentencing pro-
ceedings since the majority remanded the case for a new trial to de-
termine Ake's guilt.7 8 Justice Rehnquist thus remarked that the
discussion of the sentencing proceeding was purely dicta. 79
Finally, Justice Rehnquist stated that even if he were to agree
that Ake was entitled to a state-appointed psychiatrist, he would not
70 Id. Justice Rehnquist cited Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) for this
proposition. In Patterson, the Court held that a New York law which required that the
defendant in a murder case prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distur-
bance by a preponderance of the evidence was not a violation of the due process clause.
Id.
71 Id.




76 Id. at 1102.
77 Id. at 1101.
78 Id.
79 Id. Justice Rehnquist further questioned the necessity of providing an expert wit-
ness for Ake since the state did not initiate the line of questioning concerning Ake's
future dangerousness. Id. Rather, this testimony was obtained from psychiatrists called
as defense witnesses. Id.
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make the right as broad as the majority's rule.80 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that since a psychiatrist is not an advocate, but an expert
whose advice is sought on a factual question, the defendant should
be entitled only to "one competent opinion ... from a psychiatrist
who acts independently of the prosecutor's office." 8' Rehnquist
found no constitutional mandate which would entitle the defendant
to an opposing psychiatric view.
82
IV. THE COURT'S EXPANSION OF INDIGENT'S RIGHTS
Over fifty years ago, in Powell v. Alabama,8 3 the Supreme Court
recognized that "the right to the aid of counsel is of... fundamental
character, '8 4 and that it is the duty of the trial judge to appoint
counsel for the defendant when the defendant is charged with a cap-
ital offense and is "unable to employ counsel."8 5 Since that time,
the Court has been increasingly attentive to the needs of indigent
defendants in criminal proceedings. The Court's commitment in
Ake to assuring indigent defendants meaningful access to the judicial
process8 6 reflects the judicial trend toward minimizing the disadvan-
tages which confront indigents in criminal trials.
The cases in which indigents' rights are involved emphasize the
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness. In Ake, for example,
the Court stated that "[t]his Court has long recognized that when a
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a
criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant
has a fair opportunity to present his defense. T87 This principle is
grounded in the "Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee
of fundamental fairness,"88 and "derives from the belief that justice
cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant
is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake."8 9
Recognition of indigents' disabilities and rights led the
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1102.
82 Id.
83 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Court held that due process demands that when
the accused in a capital case is unable to employ counsel, it is the duty of the court to
appoint counsel. Id. at 71.
84 Id. at 68.
85 Id. at 73.
86 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
87 Id. at 1093.
88 Id.
89 Id. The Court's expanded notion of "fundamental fairness" in cases involving in-
digents is evident in non-criminal proceedings as well. In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1
(1981), for example, the Court in a paternity action held that to deny an indigent, puta-
1074 [Vol. 76
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Supreme Court to hold in Gideon v. Wainwright,90 that even in non-
capital cases, the indigents' right to counsel is fundamental9 and, in
Griffin v. Illinois,92 that the state must provide an indigent defendant
with a trial transcript if the transcript is necessary for an effective
appeal.93 The Court also held that an indigent defendant may not
be compelled to pay a filing fee before filing a motion for leave to
appeal,94 that an indigent defendant's right to counsel in a state
criminal conviction extends to first appeals as a matter of right,95
"and that such assistance must be effective." 96
Prior to Ake, the Supreme Court had never addressed squarely
the question of an indigent defendant's right to state-appointed psy-
chiatric assistance in presenting his defense.97 Related challenges
were brought before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, however, in United States ex. rel. Smith v. Baldi,98
and in McGarty v. O'Brien.99 In both Smith and McGarty the courts
held that the defendants were not denied due process when the trial
court failed to provide the defendants with a state subsidized psychi-
atrist.1 00 In both cases, however, the state had provided at least two
impartial experts to examine the defendant. The question of
whether denial of a psychiatric examination to the defendant consti-
tutes an abridgment of due process, therefore, was never
tive father blood grouping tests because he cannot afford them violated the indigent's
due process guarantee. Id. at 17.
90 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
91 Id. ("The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of
counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.").
92 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93 Id., see also Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357
U.S. 214 (1958). "We do not hold that a State must furnish a transcript in every case
involving an indigent defendant [but that] destitute defendants must be afforded as ade-
quate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." Id. at
216 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19).
94 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
95 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), where the Court held that the due process clause does not require a state to
provide an indigent defendant counsel for discretionary appeals.
96 105 S. Ct. at 1093 (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 830 (1985); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)).
97 But see Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963). In Bush, the Court encountered the
same facts as in Ake but never resolved the constitutional question involving the peti-
tioner's due process right to an appointed psychiatrist because the case was remanded
when new evidence concerning the petitioner's sanity was presented to the Supreme
Court. Id.
98 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
99 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951).
100 Baldi, 344 U.S. at 561; McGarty, 188 F.2d at 151. But see Baldi, 344 U.S. at 571 for
the argument that "[a] denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insanity is a
denial of ... Due Process." (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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resolved. 101
The Supreme Court distinguished Ake from Smith on a more
fundamental basis, a basis that is consistent with the "expanded no-
tion of 'fundamental fairness' [in recent cases in the] treatment of
indigent defendants."'' 0 2 The Court noted that Smith "was decided
at a time when indigent defendants in state courts had no constitu-
tional right to even the presence of counsel."'103 Since that time, the
Court has recognized "elemental constitutional rights" which have
"enhanced the ability of an indigent defendant to attain a fair hear-
ing."' 0 4 Thus, because Smith and McGarty were the products of "al-
together different variables" than Ake, the Court held that the
precedential value of these two cases was greatly diminished and the
Court was not "limited by [them] in considering whether fundamen-
tal fairness . . . requires a different result."'0 5
In light of the Court's gradual expansion of indigents' rights in
its effort to minimize the disadvantages facing indigent defendants
and to ensure them "substantive equality" in criminal proceed-
ings, 10 6 the Court's holding in Ake is consistent with both Supreme
Court precedent and due process demands.
V. ANALYSIS OF AKE
Ake is clearly in accordance with the trend of Supreme Court
cases which expand the rights of indigent defendants in criminal
proceedings. In holding that an indigent defendant is entitled
under the Constitution to the assistance of a psychiatrist, the Ake
decision can be viewed as a logical step in the Court's attempt to
minimize the legal disadvantages indigents face.
While the Ake decision is necessary to protect due process enti-
tlements, the decision is also important to protect the adversarial
nature of criminal proceedings. Justice Marshall's analysis is based
upon the notion that the adversary system is the best means of
resolving disputes. Given that "the premise of our law is that truth
is best insured by an adversarial struggle,"' 1 7 the adversary system
can only function optimally when the parties in conflict are roughly
equal in terms of "legal, investigative, and expert resources."' 08
101 Comment, supra note 42 at 643-45.
102 Id. at 638.
103 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Comment, supra note 42, at 645.
107 Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
108 Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L.
1076 [Vol. 76
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Because psychiatry is not an exact science, and psychiatrists
"disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,"
juries must determine this issue on the basis of expert testimony
offered by each party.' 0 9 If the only expert is court-appointed, as
Justice Rehnquist advocates in his dissent, 10 then the jury is likely
to regard that expert as impartial and adopt his position."' More-
over, if the expert supports the state's position, the unaided accused
will be unable to counter the psychiatrist's persuasive testimony.
12
The effect of such testimony is a trial by the "expert." 113 This re-
sults not only in "a perversion of the jury function,"' 1 4 but also calls
into question "the viability of the adversary system itself."' 1 5 Given
the fact that, regardless of what side the expert testifies on, the jury
is likely to accept this "expert" view, 1 16 experts are needed on both
sides to undercut jury bias and promote impartiality in the decision
making process. Justice Rehnquist's alternative of appointing an in-
dependent expert jeopardizes the adversarial nature of criminal pro-
ceedings and therefore should not be adopted.
The majority examined three factors to decide whether, and
under what conditions, the state must provide an indigent defend-
ant with competent psychiatric assistance. 117 As previously men-
tioned, these factors are: the private interest affected by the state's
action; the governmental interest that will be affected if the safe-
guard is provided; and, the probable value of the safeguards that are
sought, as well as "the risk of an errorneous deprivation of the af-
fected interest if those safeguards are not provided.""
18
After finding that a capital defendant such as Ake has a
REV. 1054, 1065 (1963). ("Substantial equality is certainly a minimal condition in a pro-
cedural system oriented towards a fair trial").
109 105 S. Ct. at 1096. The lack of consensus in psychiatric assessment is the result of
several factors. Most significantly, these factors include psychiatrists' personal biases,
such as their ideas concerning punishment, and their institutional biases, such as their
awareness of hospitals' inadequacies. Gardner, supra note 46, at 113-14. Moreover,
since it is impossible to determine scientifically criminal responsibility on a past occa-
sion, the psychiatrist's conclusion is at best a guess. Id.
110 See 105 S. Ct. at 1102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111 Gardner, supra note 46, at 114.
112 Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrists, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 1061, 1075-76 (1962). Jurors are likely to be persuaded by psychiatrists
because of psychiatrist's aura of professionalism, and "ring of authority which no layman
can duplicate." Id. at 1064.
113 Gardner, supra note 46, at 115.
114 Id. at 113.
115 Id.
116 Goldstein & Fine, supra note 112, at 1076.
117 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
118 Id.
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"uniquely compelling" interest in the proceeding, 1 9 the Court con-
sidered the state's interest. 120 Despite the Court's well-founded de-
termination that the state's economic interest is outweighed by both
the individual's and the state's interest in "the fair and accurate ad-
judication of criminal cases," 121 it is questionable whether the Court
thoroughly considered the potential costs involved in providing in-
digent defendants with psychiatric assistance. The Court's failure to
articulate what the defendant must demonstrate in order to satisfy
his burden of showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is
likely to be a significant factor at trial, 122 coupled with the Court's
failure to define the scope of the indigent's right to psychiatric
assistance after he has made the requisite showing, 23 will likely en-
gender significant costs in judicial time and energy as lower courts
struggle to discern the Supreme Court's meaning.
Furthermore, in the absence of clearer guidelines, courts will be
forced to make ad hoc determinations in deciding whether particu-
lar defendants have made the requisite showing entitling them to
expert assistance. Such unbridled judicial discretion may have ad-
verse consequences for the defendant and the state. Worthy de-
fendants may be denied the assistance to which they are entitled
constitutionally, and the state may incur greater expenses in prose-
cuting frivolous appeals.
The majority's reasoning is susceptible to over-extension in
other cases involving indigents' rights, 124 and could subject the state
to unlimited financial responsibility. 125 Perhaps the Court can learn
a lesson from the more than forty states which provide indigent de-
fendants with limited forms of state-subsidized expert assistance.
Some states, for example, limit the availability of expert services to
capital cases, 126 while others impose monetary limits. 12 7 Still other
119 Id. The defendant's interest is "almost uniquely compelling" because in a capital
case, his life is in jeopardy.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1095.
122 105 S. Ct. at 1100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
124 See infra note 142.
125 See, e.g., CriminalJustice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1982). This provides
that "[c]ounsel for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert,
or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his case may request them."
Should the court accept such a broad reading of Ake, the states could incur enormous
expenses. The CriminalJustice Act solves this problem by imposing a maximum dollar
limit on the expert services provided. Of course, if the courts were to impose a similar
limit, this problem would probably disappear.
126 Imposition of this limitation is unappealing, however, because it draws an artificial
distinction between capital and non-capital cases. The Constitution itself "makes no
distinction between capital and non-capital cases," Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
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jurisdictions give the trial judge discretion to appoint expert assist-
ance.1 28 Clearer guidelines concerning what the defendant must
show in order to satisfy the trial judge that the defendant's sanity
will be a significant factor at trial, in combination with a monetary
limit imposed upon the assistance provided, would serve to clarify
the constitutional right while still conserving valuable state re-
sources and protecting against frivolous appeals.
Although the Court in the final prong of the due process analy-
sis accurately determined that "without the assistance of a psychia-
trist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the
defense ... the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is
extremely high," 129 the Court's statement that the probable value of
such assistance is greatest "when the defendant's mental condition
is seriously in question," 130 is somewhat problematic. Because the
defendant's mental condition is not at issue in every criminal pro-
ceeding, the Court will not appoint psychiatric assistance unless the
defendant first makes "an ex parte threshold showing to the trial-
court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his de-
fense."13' 1 Yet this requirement of a preliminary showing provides
other courts with little guidance because, as Justice Rehnquist
points out in his dissent, "nowhere in the opinion does the Court
elucidate how that requirement is satisfied."1 32 Lower courts, ap-
plying the Ake holding, will have difficulty in determining when psy-
chiatric assistance therefore is essential.
In addressing the constitutionality of Ake's sentencing proceed-
ing, the Court employed the Mathews balancing test to determine
that due process requires psychiatric assistance at the sentencing
phase as well as the guilt phase of a criminal trial. 133 The Supreme
Court considered the appropriateness of psychiatric assistance in
the narrow "context of capital sentencing [proceedings], when the
state presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future danger-
349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring), and indigents need aid in non-capital as well as in
capital cases. Comment, supra note 42, at 636.
127 Comment, supra note 42, at 636. Several states, for example, "have provided that
the Court may fix compensation for serviccs rendered at an amount it deems reason-
able." Id.
128 Note, Recent Developments, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Refusal to Provide
Expert Witness for Indigent Defendant Denies Equal Protection - Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d
1021 (4th Cir. 1980), 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 317 (1981).
129 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
130 Id. at 1097.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 1099. ("[T]he denial of that assistance deprived [Ake] of due process.").
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ousness." 134 The Court asserted that the probable value of such
psychiatric assistance is greatest when the question of the defend-
ant's future dangerousness is a significant factor at this phase of the
trial.' 3 5 It is in this context that the defendant needs his own psychi-
atric witness to offer an opposing view rebutting the prosecution's
evidence of his future dangerousness.
1 36
The Court's conclusion that Ake was entitled constitutionally to
psychiatric assistance at his sentencing proceeding, although well-
reasoned, leaves some significant questions unanswered regarding
the extent of this right. One question is whether an indigent de-
fendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance at the sentencing phase
of a criminal trial only when the state presents evidence of his future
dangerousness, or whether this right materializes whenever the state
presents evidence of any aggravating factor. Obviously, the answer
to this question depends upon how broadly courts decide to inter-
pret Ake.
The Court's limitation of the right to psychiatric assistance to
capital sentencing proceedings is inconsistent with the purpose un-
derlying the adversary process. Arguably, the necessity of an adver-
sary proceeding in a capital case is more compelling than in a non-
capital case because the severity and irrevocability of the sanction
involved make an error in a capital sentence potentially more seri-
ous than an error in a non-capital case.1 37 Indeed, both Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his concurrence and Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
advocate limiting the right to psychiatric assistance in both the guilt
phase and the sentencing phase to capital cases. Yet, as already
noted, 38 the "Constitution makes no distinction between capital
134 Id. at 1097. It is important to note thatJustice Rehnquist concluded that the ma-
jority's discussion about the sentencing proceeding is dicta since the Court held that Ake
was entitled to a new trial with respect to his guilt. Id. at 1101 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
'35 Id. at 1097.
136 Id. The defendant could also use psychiatric assistance to "raise in the jurors'
minds question about the State's proof of an aggravating factor." Id. This function is
particularly important in Ake because future dangerousness "is an aggravating factor
under Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme." Id. at 1099.
137 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 715 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Because
of [the] basic difference between the death penalty and all other punishments, this Court
has consistently recognized that there is 'a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case."' Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 914 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). More-
over, "[rieliability in the imposition of the death sentence can be approximated only if
the sentencer is fully informed of 'all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine."' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 715, (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
138 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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and non-capital cases." 139 Since the purpose of the adversary sys-
tem is to produce just results by seeking the truth, and truth finding
is equally important in both capital and non-capital cases, the right
to psychiatric assistance should not be dependent upon the poten-
tial severity of punishment.
Furthermore, limiting this right to capital sentencing proceed-
ings is clearly inconsistent with the rest of the Court's holding in
Ake. In order to further the Court's stated purpose of assuring indi-
gents "meaningful access to the judicial process,"' 140 the right to
psychiatric assistance at the sentencing phase should extend to both
capital and non-capital proceedings.
Throughout its opinion, the Court employs a flexible due pro-
cess analysis which recognizes that due process "is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances," but requires "such procedural protections as the particu-
lar situation demands."141 While the Court could have analyzed Ake
using either a sixth amendment right to counsel 142 or a fourteenth
amendment equal protection analysis, 143 the due process guarantee
of fundamental fairness and notion of flexibility provide a more rea-
139 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 349 (Clark, J., concurring).
140 105 S. Ct. at 1098.
141 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)).
142 It is significant to note that the denial of effcctive assistance of counsel has been
held to be a violation of due process. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276 (1945). Had the
Court chosen to rest its holding on the proposition that an indigent defendant who is
denied state subsidized psychiatric assistance is deprived of his sixth amendment right to
counsel, the decision probably would have been equally as persuasive. To take one ac-
tual example, the Seventh Circuit has held that a defendant may be denied effective
assistance of counsel when the court denies an indigent defendant access to an account-
ant's assistance when he is indicted for income tax evasion. United States v. Brodson,
241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 911 (1957).
This approach, like the approach employed by the Court in Ake, is susceptible of
overextension in any area where expert assistance may be helpful. In Brodson, the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized the dangers which likely would arise if the court acknowledged
that indigent defendants are entitled to expert assistance in order to prepare an ade-
quate defense. The Court reasoned:
[i]t is apparent that the defendant is seeking not merely the services of an expert
witness but the services of an expert accountant who is to be used in preparation
and analysis of defendant's financial history and in assisting his counsel at and
before the trial of his case. Such a policy, if now established, would as a matter of
consistency be subject to extension to experts in other fields-psychiatrists, ballis-
tics experts, chemists, physicians, and an unlimited number of other specially
trained persons.
Id. at 110.
It thus appears that whether the court employs a due process or a sixth amend-
ment right to counsel analysis, the court will consider the same factors in its
analysis.
143 105 S. Ct. at 1099 n. 13.
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sonable framework to work with.1 44 Moreover, the use of a due pro-
cess analysis to secure for indigent defendants "[m]eaningful access
to justice," 145 is well-documented by a long line of cases beginning
with Griffin v. Illinois.146
By choosing to employ a due process analysis rather than an
equal protection analysis, the Court chose a path that will likely be
less burdensome and less expensive for the state. An equal protec-
tion analysis focuses on equality of resources rather than "fairness"
and is doubtlessly a more expensive alternative for the state.' 47 If,
under an equal protection analysis, "the standard is that the state
must (furnish [the indigent defendant] with legal services . . .
equivalent to those that the affluent defendant can obtain), then no
logical limitation exists short of substantial equality."' 148 Obviously,
the state will have an easier task and a greater possibility of success
in providing indigent defendants with a trial that is "fundamentally
fair," than in providing indigent and affluent defendants with condi-
tions of substantial equality. The Court's decision to employ a due
process analysis rather than a sixth amendment or an equal protec-
tion analysis was therefore well-founded.1
49
VI. OTHER RESPONSES
The responses of the federal legislature and lower courts as
well as the responses of other state legislatures and courts reflect
the perceived need for additional aid to indigents. Moreover, the
144 One commentator states that "[t]he due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments are perhaps more reasonable grounds on which to interpret Griffin and its
progeny, and on which to base a constitutional right to aid in addition to counsel. Note,
supra note 108, at 1070. He stresses the flexibility incorporated into the due process
concept so that "[a]s our civilization advances, our notions of due process and funda-
mental fairness may be enlarged or altered." Id.
145 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
146 351 U.S. 12 (1956) In Griffin, the Court relied on both the due process clause and
the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
120, 130 n. 1 (1985).
147 See Note, supra note 108, at 1073. ("The determination of what 'assistance' is es-
sential to make counsel effective depends upon whether the standard is one of 'funda-
mental fairness' or of achieving substantial equality between indigent and affluent
defendants").
148 Id. at 1070. The commentator also argues that an equal protection analysis in this
context is inappropriate because "the traditional purpose of the equal protection clause
[has been] ... to prevent discrimination in statutes that were primarily intended to be
discriminatory." Id.
149 But see The Supreme Court, 1984 Tenn Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 138
(1985), where one commentator has criticized the Court's determination to use a due
process analysis rather than an equal protection analysis because the due process ap-
proach is more conservative and it allows "the Burger Court [to avoid] focusing atten-
tion on the plight of the poor." Id. at 138.
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sheer number of statutory' 50 and judicial schemes which already
provide state-subsidized expert assistance indicates that the
Supreme Court's holding in Ake is not extreme but is, in fact, an
almost belated response to a well-recognized problem.
The Federal Criminal Justice Act,15 1 enacted in 1964, "was the
first significant grant of federal aid to indigents for obtaining ex-
perts and investigation facilities."' 152 Section (e) of the Act "pro-
vides for the allocation of money to pay for expert witnesses"
needed by the indigent defendants.15  The Act places a limit on the
compensation available to each expert,54 and authorizes expenses
only for services that are essential to an adequate defense. 155 Since
"[i]t is clear that the Act comprehends within its definition of 'expert
services' the assistance of a psychiatric expert in preparing and
presenting an insanity defense,"' 156 it appears that, even if this fed-
eral statutory scheme is not an absolute guarantee for indigent de-
fendants in Ake's position, it is a step toward insuring fairness. It
provides at least a minimal degree of protection, protection which
was unavailable in Oklahoma state courts prior to Ake.
In addition to the federal statutory response, several lower fed-
eral courts have recognized the indigent's right to psychiatric assist-
ance in presenting a defense. 57 In United States v. Lincoln,' 58 for
example, the Eighth Circuit stated "that when an insanity defense is
appropriate the indigent defendant is entitled to psychiatric assist-
ance necessary to both the preparation and presentation of an ade-
quate defense."'159
150 See supra note 39.
151 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1969).
152 Comment, supra note 42 at 633.
153 United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
154 Since 1969, that limit has been $300. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1969).
155 Id. ("Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the
services are necessary and that the defendant is financially unable to obtain them, the
Court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services on behalf of the defendant.").
156 Chavis, 476 F.2d at 1141.
157 See e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 542 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1106 (1977); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964), af'd, 344 F.2d 672
(5th Cir. 1965) (when insanity is seriously at issue, due process clause of fourteenth
amendment requires the State to provide defendant with competent psychiatric assist-
ance for preparation and trial of his case); U.S. v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1163 (5th
Cir. 1974) (defendant who did not receive adequate psychiatric assistance in criminal
trial was denied effective assistance of counsel).
158 542 F.2d at 746.
159 Id. at 750. One commentator states that some modern federal courts following the
trend which recognizes expanded rights for indigent criminal defendants "have held
that an indigent's due process right to effective counsel encompasses his right to the
appointment of an expert to assist in the preparation of the defense." Note, supra note
128, at 317.
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Many states, through either statutory enactments or judicial
decisionmaking, provide indigent defendants with varying degrees
of state-compensated expert services. 160 In fact, since over forty
states provided for some type of subsidized expert assistance,
161
Oklahoma at the time of Ake was clearly in the minority in failing to
provide any assistance. Constitutional as well as practical considera-
tions now compel all states to assure "the defendant access to a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examina-
tion and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the




In holding that an indigent defendant is constitutionally enti-
tled to the assistance of a psychiatrist, Ake v. Oklahoma provides the
indigent defendant with a "more meaningful access to the judicial
process." 163 In Ake, the Supreme Court takes a logical and neces-
sary step toward assuring indigent defendants "fundamental fair-
ness" in state criminal proceedings by acknowledging the
disadvantages confronting such defendants and providing for them
a more meaningful opportunity to be heard. While the decision
rests upon compelling constitutional and practical grounds and rep-
resents a logical extension of judicial precedent, it is not entirely
problem-free.
The most obvious criticism of Ake is the opportunity it provides
for overextension. 164 The Mathews balancing approach employed in
Ake can be used to justify state-appointed expert assistance in any
situation where such assistance may be useful. Such overextension
may cause the state to incur enormous costs.
Furthermore, the failure of the Court to elucidate the require-
ments for a preliminary showing concerning the defendant's san-
ity, 16 5 and the failure of the Court to adequately define the scope of
the indigent's right to a psychiatrist, combine to leave courts uncer-
tain in the future about how to implement this right. Due process
requires that the indigent defendant be given the opportunity to
present his claims fairly. The state's duty, however, is not "to dupli-
160 105 S. Ct. at 1094; Note, supra note 128, at 322.
161 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
162 Id. at 1097.
163 Id. at 1098.
164 See Comment, supra note 42, at 643.
165 105 S. Ct. at 1100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cate the legal arsenal" available to another defendant.' 66 Should
courts interpret Ake as requiring the state to perform such a duty,
the state would lack the resources necessary for such an overwhelm-
ing task and may be unable to supply assistance to all those who
qualify for it. The problem remaining after Ake, then, is the same
problem resulting from the Griffin-Douglas line of cases, that is, "de-
termining where to 'draw the line."'
167
BETH LEVINE
166 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). Moreover, "the fact that a particular
service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is
constitutionally required." Id.
167 Note, supra note 108, at 1069. Since Ake was decided on due process grounds
rather than on equal protection grounds, Ake assures only "fundamental fairness" and
not substantial equality. The problem of draining state resources is then unlikely to
arise if Ake is interpreted as providing only this "fairness" minimum.
